Grid Characteristics and the Interface Between Competition and Regulation Policies by Meade, Richard
Grid Characteristics and the 
Interface between Competition 
and Regulation Policies
ISCR Workshop - Developments in 
Electricity Network Price Regulation, 
Victoria University of Wellington,
20 February 2008
Richard Meade
Research Principal, ISCR
Principal, Cognitus Advisory Services Limited
Teaching Fellow, Victoria University of Wellington
richard.meade@cognitus.co.nz
Background
• Potential overlaps and clashes now arise re Transpower as between:
– The Electricity Commission (EC) as electricity industry governance body 
– The Commerce Commission (CC) under Part 4A of the Commerce Act (CA)
Æ Recognised in part by the CC/EC MoU of August 2007
• In general there are questions as to the appropriate boundaries between 
competition authorities and industry regulators
• This boundary can be affected by grid characteristics, such as those 
inherent to:
– Transpower
– New Zealand
– Grids in general
• This presentation explores the demarcation of this boundary and how it is 
affected by grid characteristics, as a first step towards an ongoing 
comparative analysis of the institutional dynamics of competition and 
regulation policies in the electricity sector (for presentation at IAEE 2008)
General Demarcation Issues
• Competition policy generally seeks to protect and encourage competition, 
e.g. through:
– Controls on mergers and takeovers
– Prohibitions of certain anti-competitive practices
– Prohibitions on the acquisition or abuse of market dominance
• Presumption is that but for rules and interventions to curtail anti-competitive 
practices, workable competition would not prevail (allows for imperfection)
• Competition is seen as the means towards the objectives of enhancing 
economic efficiency and maximising social welfare
• Sometimes applied with a bias towards consumer welfare (which can be 
stretched to also allow for producer welfare when investment is recognised 
as important for consumer welfare)
• One challenge is to recognise the importance of dynamic efficiency over 
static textbook conceptions of efficiency, particularly in sectors where 
innovation is an important source of consumer gains Æ e.g. allowing 
competition for markets and not just trying to impose competition within 
markets
General Demarcation Issues – cont’d
• Industry-specific regulation is typically justified on the basis 
that workable competition is absent and unlikely to arise in 
some sectors or under certain conditions
• The aim is to regulate the relevant firms in such a way as to 
best mimic competitive outcomes (i.e. price, quantity, quality 
and contestability/entry), recognising industry cost structures 
will deviate from competitive ideals
• Perennial problem is the informational advantages enjoyed by 
the regulated firm
• As for competition policy, the challenge is to not impede 
dynamically efficient innovations Æ made all the more difficult 
here due to investment impacts (entrants and incumbents)
General Demarcation Issues – cont’d
• Danger is that regulation could impede as much as facilitate 
the advent of workable competition – e.g.:
– Creating institutional inflexibilities based on old technologies
– Using the wrong or inadequate regulatory models
• Important questions include:
– What are the appropriate boundaries for delimiting workable 
competition? Æ a focus of today’s presentation
– What should be the tests for introducing regulation?
– What regulatory models should be applied, and how?
– How should those models be monitored and changed?
– What tests should be applied for abandoning regulation in favour
of competition policy?
• In general, what institutional arrangements do we have/need 
to ensure an efficient transition between competition and 
regulation policies (and vice versa)?
Relevant Grid Characteristics – General
• Electrical networks function as an “organic” whole, 
with important interdependencies and at least partial 
substitutability between the grid and:
– Generation – location, type/stability, wholesale market 
(e.g. LMPs versus zonal prices), capacity margins, …
– Load – location, demand flexibility, prices, …
– Distribution – location/creep, technical demarcation …
– Competing energies and networks – gasfields/pipelines, 
coalmines/railways, LNG terminals/pipelines, …
• Important dynamic considerations:
– Real time – ancillary services and grid constraints affect 
energy prices, generator/load incentives and competition
– Longer-term – location of generator and load investments 
affected by grid constraints, affecting competition …
Relevant Grid Characteristics – NZ/TPNZ
• Physical/technical – creating problems for competing grid provision:
– Grid is “long skinny and sparse”
– Limited DC – hard to secure property rights in loop flows
• Institutional – creating problems for grid competition:
– EC’s transmission pricing methodology – “non-contestable right to tax”
(but helps reduce strategic uncertainty for generators?)
– EC’s grid investment test (GIT) requires Transpower to evaluate 
generation alternatives to grid upgrades
– Have locational marginal prices, but no FTRs or TCCs
– Renewables dominance/preference – lack of locational flexibility 
compared with other fuel types
– Limited embedded generation, in part due to EIRA
– RMA affects generation viability/investment
– No merchant transmission, and distribution not able to own/operate high 
voltage network
– Muted commercial objectives plus state ownership – monopoly rents 
reduced and socialised anyway? (but efficiency incentives blunted too?) 
Commerce Commission and Transpower
• Relevant purpose re Transpower is found in s57E of the Commerce Act:
… to promote the efficient operation of markets directly related to … transmission services 
through targeted control for the long-term benefit of consumers by ensuring that suppliers—
(a) are limited in their ability to extract excessive profits; and
(b) face strong incentives to improve efficiency and provide services at a quality that reflects 
consumer demands; and
(c) share the benefits of efficiency gains with consumers, including through lower prices.
• Note that producer profits are material here only to the extent they are 
excessive, and that producers cannot expect to pocket all of the efficiency 
gains they make
• Processes: CC sets thresholds, assesses compliance with those thresholds,
conducts inquiries following any threshold breach, and can control prices, 
quantities and/or quality if breach leads to a declaration of control
• Transpower faces CPI-X price threshold, and reliability maintenance (plus 
consumer engagement) threshold
• CC only examines Transpower’s grid expenditures or other relevant matters 
in the event of a breach of either or both of these thresholds
Electricity Commission and Transpower
• Principal objective (Government Policy Statement, October 2006) is 
to:
– Ensure that electricity is produced and delivered to all classes of 
consumers in an efficient, fair, reliable, and environmentally sustainable 
manner; and
– Promote and facilitate the efficient use of electricity
• Note the absence of any consideration of producer surplus here, but 
see below
• EC approves Transpower’s economic and reliability investments and 
its interim grid expenditure, as well as its pricing methodology, and 
develops/recommends benchmark agreements and interconnection 
rules
• Under the GPS Transpower is entitled to recover the full economic 
costs of its services, and make an appropriate return on its 
investments
EC and Transpower – cont’d
• Transpower thus sets its own revenue requirements subject to 
the average price constraints imposed on it by the CC under 
Part 4A
• EC’s pricing methodology allocates Transpower’s revenue 
requirement across its customers (the “right to tax”), while the 
GIT controls Transpower’s grid expenditures (based on “net 
benefits”, not the CC’s wider “efficiency” test)
• Areas of functional overlap between EC and CC include:
– How expenditures under approved grid investments are treated 
under the Part 4A thresholds
– Interface between CC’s price thresholds and EC’s transmission 
pricing methodology
– Respective body’s treatment of valuation and pricing 
methodologies, pricing, quality and information disclosure
Discussion
• Pre-1986 – old school industry regulation:
– No competition policy (or objective)
– Generation and transmission integrated in state-owned 
monopoly with slack commercial objectives and political 
pricing
– Consequently little prospect of (or place for?) workable 
competition in generation or transmission
• 1980s reforms – mix of old and new:
– Now have Commerce and State-owned Enterprises Acts, 
and only light-handed regulation (Part 4A not yet born)
– Transmission and generation still bundled, but commercial 
objectives and embryonic contestability (generation)
– Monolithic generation provided workable competition and 
coordination with grid, so lack of Part 4A and EC OK?
Discussion – cont’d
• 1990s – competition focus in generation, with grid issues 
parked:
– Same regulatory regime, but transmission and energy prices 
unbundled, and Transpower separated from ECNZ
– Advent of NZEM and split of ECNZ paves way for generation 
contestability, but gentailing advent and lines/energy split after 
EIRA undermines?
– Oligopolistic generation less able to workably compete with grid
(coordination problems) – rationale for Part 4A and EC?
• 2000s – specific regulation of grid:
– Part 4A added to Commerce Act, and EC created
– Oligopolistic competition in generation, with possible increase in 
embedded generation (more workable competition with grid?)
– A new stalemate …?
Discussion – cont’d
• Any functional conflicts or discontinuities between EC and CC 
should in principle be resolvable
• Real question is whether the existing arrangements resolve, or 
create/perpetuate, the perceived problems:
– Grid faces emerging/changing competition from embedded generation 
and gas  (imagine a major gas find in the Southern Basin …)
– But do the EC’s GIT and transmission pricing methodology aid 
competitive generation, or prefer the grid? Do they necessitate Part 4A?
– What are the technical and institutional barriers to merchant 
transmission – if we (can) fix these, is Part 4A redundant, or are both 4A 
and the EC part of the problem (i.e. already redundant)?
– With Transpower state owned, do we even care (or care enough to 
warrant the costly protections)?
– If we do care, would lines company ownership of Transpower be the 
least-cost alternative to regulation, with open access rules the only 
required constraints? Æ cf new proposals for reversion to light-handed 
regulation of customer-owned lines companies, unregulated US G&T 
cooperatives, …
Conclusion
• In general we should wish for a healthy and ongoing arm-wrestle between 
competition and regulation policies
• Certain grid characteristics, viewed alone, suggest the likely absence of 
workable competition in transmission
• Taking a broader view, grid competition can arise from many quarters – or 
not – in a large part due to institutional arrangements (and over time, from 
technological and other changes)
• New Zealand’s current arrangements (Part 4A and the EC) are perhaps a 
consequence of our reform path, but potentially also perpetuate any lack of 
workable competition in transmission and thus themselves
• Stones not yet fully turned over include:
– Greater use of merchant transmission
– Making Transpower’s “right to tax” (per the EC’s pricing methodology) contestable
– Customer (i.e. lines) ownership of the grid
Thank You – Any Questions?
